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This paper shows, using data from both the US and the UK, that average plant size is 
larger in denser markets. However, many popular theories of agglomeration – spillovers, 
cost advantages and improved match quality – predict that establishments should 
be smaller in cities. The paper proposes a theory based on monopsony in labour markets 
that can explain the stylized fact – that firms in all labour markets have some market 
power but that they have less market power in cities. It also presents evidence that the 
labour supply curve to individual firms is more elastic in larger markets. 
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Introduction 
Economists have long been puzzled by the phenomenon of agglomeration in economic 
activity.  A higher density of economic activity typically means higher land prices for 
which workers need to be compensated for by higher wages if they are to locate in the 
agglomerations (see Glaeser and Mare, 2001, for US evidence that the real wages of 
workers are no higher in agglomerations).  For firms to wish to remain in the 
agglomeration they must derive some advantage to off-set the negative impact of higher 
land and labour prices on profits.  There is much theorizing about what these advantages 
might be (see Duranton and Puga, 2003, for a recent survey) from something boring like 
lower transport costs to something sexy like knowledge spill-overs (see Moretti, 2004a).  
There is good evidence that firm productivity is higher in agglomerations (see, for 
example, Ciccone and Hall, 1996, Moretti, 2004b, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti, 
2007) so that some of the advantages seem to lie on the revenue and not the cost side – 
though more controversy about the reason for this (see Rosenthal and Strange, 2003, for a 
recent review of the empirical evidence). 
  This papers starts by proposing a stylised fact about agglomerations – the average 
number of workers per establishment is higher in larger markets – this is what I call the 
plant size place effect.  I show the existence of the plant size-place effect using data from 
both the UK and the US and it is a very robust finding.  This paper is not the first to 
present a correlation between establishment and market size – researchers in economic 
geography, industrial organization and labour economics have all been interested in the   2
determinants of and correlates with plant size
1.  But I think it a fair summary to say that 
the plant size- place effect is not centre stage in any of the papers that note it nor is its 
pervasiveness recognized in the literature.  For example, Krugman (1998, p172) wrote “it 
is, for example, a well-documented empirical regularity that both plants and firms in 
large cities tend to be smaller than those in small cities” (his italics).  As we shall see, this 
is not completely wrong but it is a very long way from being completely right. But it is 
worthwhile briefly reviewing the other papers that have commented on the plant size 
place effect. 
Among economic geographers, Dinlersoz (2004) remarks on it  while Holmes and 
Stevens (2004) compare small, medium and large cities showing that service sector 
establishments are bigger in large cities while manufacturing establishments are smaller 
(a conclusion we will see below though we argue this pattern is very much the 
exception)
2.  It is perhaps in Industrial Organization that one gets closest to a general 
statement about the plant size-place effect.  In IO there is a widespread belief that product 
market competition intensifies as market size increases and evidence for this (see, for 
example, Sutton, 1991, or Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991).  The increased competition 
implies that price-cost margins are lower in large markets and hence firm size must be 
bigger to cover the fixed cost.  This leads to a predicted positive correlation between 
plant and market size.  Market size is generally hard to measure but for non-tradeables 
one can link market and population size so empirical applications have focused on non-
tradeables.  For example, Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) present evidence for 13 retail 
                                                 
1 Though labour economists do not seem to have noticed the correlation of plant and market size– see 
Brown, Hamilton and Medoff, (1990) for a summary of the many variables found to be correlated with 
plant size. 
2 See also Wheeler (2006) who considers the determinants of plant size, Holmes (2005) who relates the 
location of sales offices to firm size, a related though slightly different issue.   3
industries, and Syverson (2004) does the same for ready-mixed concrete.  For tradeable 
goods one would expect the relationship between market size and local population to be 
much weaker or non-existent.  However this paper shows that the plant size –place effect 
is pervasive across all types of industry (though it may be larger for some industries than 
others) – this fact guides the choice of theory in the second part of the paper. 
The plant size place effect might be thought an exceedingly boring stylized fact 
but I then go on to show that many popular theories of agglomeration – productivity spill-
overs and improved match quality predict – if they have any prediction at all – exactly the 
opposite, namely that establishment sizes should, on average, be smaller in dense labour 
markets.   
  I then propose a theory that can explain this finding as well as the other stylized 
facts about agglomerations – all labour markets are monopsonistic but less so in 
agglomerations.  I show that this means that large, productive employers will have a 
comparative advantage in locating in agglomerations leading to the correlations of wages, 
productivity and employer size noted above.  This theory has many parallels to the IO 
models mentioned earlier that emphasize how product market competition rises as market 
size increases (see, for example, Syverson, 2004).  Here, I choose to emphasize labour 
market competition as the plant size place effect seems present in both tradeable and non-
tradeable industries. 
  The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section, I document the existence, 
for both the US and the UK, of a very robust correlation between the average size of 
establishments and the size of the local labour market.  This correlation cannot be 
explained by differences in industrial composition, nor is it caused by a few very large   4
firms only locating in large labour markets.  The second section then outlines the problem 
this stylized fact causes for a number of common theories of agglomeration based on the 
assumption of perfectly competitive labour markets.  The third section then shows how 
monopsony in the labour market combined with employer heterogeneity can explain the 
plant size place effect.  I provide an explanation for why labour markets should be more 
competitive in denser labour markets and a more formal model of this idea.  The fourth 
section then present further evidence in support of the monopsony  hypothesis. 
            5
1.  The Plant Size-Place Effect 
In this section I establish the basic stylised fact that establishments have, on average, 
more workers in larger markets. 
US Evidence 
The main US data used here come from the County Business Patterns (CBP) for 1999, 
This contains information on total employment and total number of establishments as 
well as the distribution of the number of establishments by size class.  To investigate the 
relationship between average establishment size and agglomeration we need a measure of 
market size, so we need a definition of a market and a measure of size.  We experiment 
with a variety of definitions and measures and show that the basic stylised fact is robust.  
For size we primarily use total employment in the labour market however defined though 
we also experiment with employment density i.e. employment per unit land area.   
As a definition of a labour market I first start with the 3109 counties in the 
contiguous states of the US (i.e. I exclude Hawaii and Alaska).  7 of these counties do not 
report total employment for confidentiality reasons so the basic sample size is 3102.  
Some descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  The average employment level 
across counties is 35441 with an average number of establishments of 2243.  The average 
across counties of average establishment size is 11.95.  Of course, these averages are very 
different if one weights by employment – the average worker is in a county with total 
employment of 531074, 29084 establishments and an average establishment size of 
16.75.  Figure 1 presents the basic relationship between the log of average establishment 
size and log of total employment in the county.  There is a clear positive, concave 
relationship.  Table 2 then presents some simple regressions.   6
The first row estimates a simple linear relationship between log average 
establishment size and log total employment.  The coefficient on log total employment is 
0.171 with a standard error of 0.003 confirming the existence of a significant relationship 
(something of little surprise given Figure 1).  The second row then models the 
relationship as a quadratic with the quadratic term being very significant.  The third 
column then includes a cubic term, showing this is insignificant. 
That the relationship between log average establishment size and log labour 
market size is well-approximated by a quadratic can be confirmed by estimating a kernel 
regression.  Figure 2 uses data from Figure 1 and shows the fitted regression line from the 
quadratic specification and the kernel regression line
3.  One can see that the quadratic is a 
pretty good fit.  Figure 2 suggests that the positive relationship between average 
employment size and labour market size is weak once total employment in the county 
reaches 250000 – about half of workers are in smaller counties than this.  So the plant 
size effect documented here is not really a difference between large and small cities (the 
focus of much research in economic geography and a literal reading of the application of 
the Krugman quote given in the introduction) but between cities, towns and villages.  The 
next 3 rows of Table 2 do the same analysis but using employment per square mile as the 
measure of labour market size.  The results are very similar, not surprising given that the 
correlation between the two measures of labour market size is 0.90. 
One problem with using US counties as the unit of analysis is that they are 
political entities without any intrinsic economic meaning.  Workers may live in one 
county and work in another, particularly where counties are geographically small (as they 
are more likely to be in the eastern states).  Accordingly I use data on inter-county 
                                                 
3 This is based on a bandwidth of 0.5, an Epanechnikov kernel and 1000 grid points.   7
commuting patterns from the 2000 Census to compute measures of the ‘labour pool’ 
available to an employer in each county. 
As I lack any finer geographical information I assume all workers and employers 
in each county to be located at the population-weighted centroid.  For each county I then 
look at the distances travelled by workers in the county.  I compute a median distance, 
and 75
th , 90
th  and 95
th percentiles
4.  These distances are also reported in Table 1
5.  For 
all but 32 counties the median worker lives in the county so that median distance for the 
commute is zero.  But moving further out one finds larger numbers.  Some of the 
estimates for some counties are crazy - typically these are small counties in which one or 
more workers reports living a very long way away.  Whether these are included or 
excluded from the analysis that follows does not make very much difference so I include 
all in the analysis. 
  Having computed these distances I then compute the total number of workers who 
live within these distances.  So, if the 75
th percentile for one particular county includes 3 
counties then I use as my measure of the labour pool the total employment in those 3 
counties.  The average values of the labour pools are reported in Table 1.  Because the 
available data is not very fine, these measures are crude but the British data I use later is 
much better and the results are very similar. 
  The bottom half of Table 2 then uses these measures as total labour market size.  
The results are very similar.  Note that these measures of total employment come from a 
                                                 
4 One could also compute the maximum though these tend to be very large numbers indeed as most 
counties have at least one worker reporting traveling hundreds of miles to work. 
5 These commuting distances are rather low as the assumption that all the population in a county is at its 
centroid means that commuting distances are measured as zero for those who live and work within the 
same county.   8
different data source from the CBP data so allay any concerns that measurement error in 
total county-level employment in the CBP can explain the correlation observed earlier. 
  One might also be concerned that this result is driven by the presence of a few 
large plants that only locate in dense labour market areas because they would be a 
sizeable fraction of total employment in most counties if they chose to locate there.  This 
is not the case: Figure 3 plots the fraction of plants in different size classes against total 
employment.  One sees a smaller fraction on establishments with 1-5 employees in large 
labour markets but a positive relationship between the fraction of establishments with 5-9 
employees and labour market size each of whom is a negligible fraction of total 
employment in any county. 
  There are perhaps other concerns about the source of the relationship shown in 
Figure 1.  One is that it is a spurious relationship driven by the ‘dartboard’ effect 
discussed by Ellison and Glaeser (1997).  One way to understand this would be to 
consider the case when each region is so small there is only one firm in each region.  In 
this case total employment and average establishment size will be perfectly correlated but 
this relationship is clearly spurious.  However, this is a ‘small numbers’ phenomenon – as 
the number of firms in a region increases the effect goes away.  One way to see this is to 
compare the true relationship in Figure 1 with what it would look like if plant location 
was independent of establishment size.  To this end I simply keep the number of firms in 
each county fixed at the true value and then randomly assign firm sizes to them and look 
at the relationship between average firm size and total market size when we do this.  This 
simulated relationship looks like that shown in the second panel of Figure 4 – it is   9
nothing like the true relationship which is shown in the first panel
6.  The ‘dartboard’ 
problem cannot explain our findings because most counties have so many establishments 
that laws of large numbers can be applied. 
  One might also be concerned that average plant size varies greatly across 
industries and the location of industries varies across labour markets.  But, the effect is at 
work within industries.  Table 3 reports the results from regressions in which the unit of 
observation is an industry in a county, with results for different levels of industry 
disaggregation from 2- to 6-digit being shown.  For each level of disaggregation, two 
results are shown, one without industry dummies and one with.  In all cases there 
remains, within industries, a robust correlation between average plant size and total 
labour market size.  One problem with the US data is that total employment is not 
reported for many cells for confidentiality reasons – to get around this problem I also 
report results for the fraction of total establishments with 1-4, 5-9, 10-19 and 20+ 
employees.  The results are qualitatively similar – the fraction of very small plants is 
higher in smaller markets and the fraction of plants even in the next size category is 
increasing in market size.  
  One might also be concerned that the nature of the plant size-place effect differs 
across industries, especially in the light of the conclusion of Dinlersoz (2004) that 
average plant size declines in manufacturing as cities grow and the conclusion of Holmes 
and Stevens (2004, p227) that “big-city establishments in services are larger than the 
national average, whereas those in manufacturing are smaller” which suggest the plant 
size-place effect only exists in some sectors and not others.  To investigate this Figure 5 
                                                 
6 It is not just the slope that demonstrates this but also the range of the two axes.  As the number of plants in 
different areas is being held constant the small areas are predicted to have much more employment than is 
the case under the ‘dartboard’ model.   10
shows the plot of average plant size against total employment for the nine 1-digit 
industries.  One notices that, with the exception of the first category (and one would not 
expect much logging in large cities!), there is a plant size-place effect in all industries.  
However we do see the Holmes-Stevens conclusion – that, in manufacturing, average 
plant size in large cities is smaller than in small cities (and the evidence cited in the 
Krugman quote only applies to manufacturing) – but it remains the case that the average 
plant size in large cities is bigger than it is in small counties.  Manufacturing has a 
quadratic relationship between log average plant size and market size like other sectors 
but it does turn down once we reach cities of a reasonably large size.  That there is this 
significant quadratic relationship is confirmed by looking at the regressions in Table 4.  
However, this negative relationship between plant size and place size does seem unique 
to manufacturing and only emerges when one restricts the sample to cities – furthermore 
we will not see it in the UK data. 
 UK Evidence   
The main UK data used in this section comes from the Annual Business Inquiry 
(ABI) for 1998-2002 inclusive.  This is a very similar survey to the CBP data used above.  
As labour market areas I start by using the UK’s Office for National Statistics ‘Travel-to-
Work Areas’ (TTWAs).  I use the 1998 classification for which there are 303 in Great 
Britain (and another 15 in Northern Ireland which are not used here because the ABI data 
does not exist there).  TTWAs are explicitly constructed to be local labour markets as 
“the fundamental criterion is that, of the resident economically active population, at least 
75% actually work in the area, and also, that of everyone working in the area, at least   11
75% actually live in the area”
7.  This means that UK TTWAs have the advantage over US 
counties that they are intended to be economically meaningful.  Some descriptive 
statistics are shown in Table 5.  The median size across TTWAs is 30000 and the median 
across workers is 225000. 
Figure 6 presents the basic stylized fact for the UK – average plant size is larger 
in larger labour markets.  Each point on this graph represents a single TTWA – the 
horizontal axis is the log of total employment in the TTWA, the vertical axis the log of 
average plant size.  There is a very clear positive correlation between the two albeit with 
the largest TTWA (London) appearing to be something of an outlier.   
  Table 6 then formalizes this relationship by estimating some regressions.  The 
first row estimates a simple linear relationship between log average establishment size 
and log total employment.  The coefficient on log total employment is 0.149 with a 
standard error of 0.009 confirming the existence of a significant relationship (something 
of little surprise given Figure 6).  The second row then includes a dummy for London – 
this makes the relationship slightly stronger.  The third row then models the relationship 
as a quadratic with the quadratic term being very significant.  The fourth row then shows 
that London is no longer such an outlier.  The fifth row then includes a cubic term, 
showing this is significant.  The sixth row changes the measure of market size to 
employment density but the results are very similar – the correlation between the two 
measures of market size is 0.87.  Figure 6 also plots the fitted regression line from the 
quadratic specification (excluding the London dummy) and a kernel regression line
8.  
One can see that, as in the US, the quadratic is a pretty good fit.   
                                                 
7 In practice this condition remains an unattainable ideal. 
8 This is based on a bandwidth of 0.5, an Epanechnikov kernel and 1000 grid points.   12
  Although TTWAs are constructed to be economically meaningful, they 
nevertheless introduce discontinuities across the borders between them that have no 
foundation in economic reality.  Areas close to a TTWA border may well draw more 
heavily on employment from a neighbouring TTWA than the one in which they are 
classified.  So, we repeat the exercise we did for the US in constructing labour pools from 
commuting data.  But one big advantage of the UK data over the US data is that we have 
information on average plant size at the level of wards – of which there are 
approximately 10000 in England and Wales (we cannot use the Scottish ones as we 
cannot match the ward codes in the separate data sets).   
  To construct a labour pool I construct, for each ward, a source area.  Sometimes 
this is just the ward itself, sometimes those within 5 or 10km, sometimes excluding the 
own ward to ensure that there is no spurious correlation between this plant’s activities 
and the measure of the labour pool.  Then, using the commuting data from the 1991 
Census I compute the median, 75
th, 90
th, and 95
th percentiles of commuting distance for 
workers in the source area.  Then I compute the labour pool as the number of people who 
live within these distances.  The results are reported in Table 7 – the bottom line is that, 
however the measure of the labour pool is constructed, the correlation is always the same: 
plants are bigger on average in larger labour markets.     
 
2.  The Plant Size-Place Effect and Popular Theories of Agglomeration 
The plant size place-effect might seem to be an exceedingly boring stylized fact.  But it 
becomes more interesting when one considers how popular theories of agglomeration 
fare in explaining it. Any model of agglomeration must be able to write down an   13
equilibrium profit function for a firm if it chooses different locations.  A necessary 
condition for equilibrium is that the firm’s profit-maximizing choices are consistent with 
the proposed equilibrium. We will use this necessary condition to derive some useful 
results – note that we do not need to specify complete models to do this exercise and we 
do not seek to do so
9. 
  Let us write the ‘reduced-form’ revenue function in region r for a firm after all 
other choice variables have been concentrated out apart from employment as  () , r R NA  
where  r A  is a measure of ‘productivity’ in region r which will include all the ways in 
which agglomeration affects the revenue function (including any effects that work 
through the costs of non-labour inputs and including any possible externalities).  This 
revenue function can have increasing returns over some region but must be eventually 
concave for the individual employer’s decision to be well-defined.  If the labour market is 
competitive I can then write a ‘reduced-form’ profit function for the firm in region r as: 
  ( ) , rr r R NA W N π =−  (1) 
where  r W  is the wage in region r.  If there is an interior solution with some economic 
activity in all regions, this must be equalized across regions
10.  We are interested in 
restrictions on the form of  () , r R AN for the model to predict larger establishments in 
regions with high wages and productivity?  To answer this question it is convenient to 
imagine that there is a continuum of regions indexed by the wage, W, and a function 
                                                 
9 Though many worked-out general equilibrium models of agglomeration in the literature do not predict the 
plant size place effect e.g. the classic model of Krugman (1991) has the prediction that plant size is the 
same in all areas. 
10 Not all theories of agglomeration have an interior solution – often they have as their equilibrium a corner 
solution in which some areas have all firms and others none – a good example (because I refer to it 
extensively later on) is Helsley and Strange (1990) where, in equilibrium, all cities are the same size but not 
all land is occupied.  But it is more realistic to consider an interior solution where some firms choose to 
locate in cities and others in villages and there is a continuum of intensity of economic activity.     14
() AW  that gives the corresponding level of productivity that, in equilibrium, must be a 
positive function of the wage for any region where firms choose to locate because no firm 
would choose to locate in a region with higher wages and lower productivity than some 
other region.  Denote by  () NW the demand for employment in a region with wage W.  
This must satisfy the equation:  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) , N R NW AW W =  (2) 
Note that this cannot, on its own, be used to predict the relationship between plant size 
and region because the function A(W) is endogenous.  But, in equilibrium, profits must 
be equalized across regions and the following Proposition uses this fact to show when the 
model can predict the plant size-place effect. 
 










       ( 3 )  
Proof:  Differentiating (2) we have that:  








=  (4) 
From the second-order conditions for maximization the sign of this depends on the sign 
of the numerator. Profit equalization across regions requires, from the envelope condition 
that: 
  ( ) ( ) .' 0 WA RAW NW π = −=      (5) 
Using this to eliminate  () ' A W  in (4) we have that the sign of the numerator depends on:   15
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 (6) 
Which gives (3). 
 
 
Proposition 1 says that models of agglomeration that are capable of explaining the plant 
size-place effect must have a reduced-form revenue function that satisfies the condition in 
(3).  Put simply (and obviously), the condition in (3) says that it must be the case that 
large employers have a comparative advantage in cities. 
  I have derived this result using the assumption that employers are homogeneous 
so that all regions with some economic activity must offer equal profits.  What happens if 
there is heterogeneity among employers so that some will strictly prefer to locate in the 
city and some in the village?  If there is a marginal employer profits must be equal in the 
two regions for this employer and Proposition 1 applies for this marginal firm.  By 
continuity the condition must also be satisfied for employers close enough to the margin.  
It is conceivable that away from the margin there is some effect at work making 
employers who strictly prefer the city very different in size than those who strictly prefer 
the village even though this is not true at the margin but any such effect must work 
against the mechanism described here and overcome it. 
  Now consider whether some popular models of agglomeration satisfy the 
condition in (3). 
  First consider theories that are based on lower costs of some inputs or spill-overs 
or externalities in which the revenue function can be written as ( ) r A RN so that regions 










       ( 7 )  
so, by Proposition 1,  predicts that plant sizes will be smaller in agglomerations
11. 
  Next, consider a matching model that suggest the quality of the match between 
worker and employer is better in denser labour markets.  In this case one can write the 
productivity effect of being in a denser market as being labour-augmenting and the 
revenue function as () r R AN .  This revenue function has the feature that:  










       ( 8 )  
As the equilibrium of the firm must be on the concave part of the revenue function we 
must have () '' 0 RA N < .  So, this model also predicts smaller plant sizes in regions with 
high wages. 
  Next suppose there is no productivity effect of locating in a city but the costs of 
recruiting workers are lower.  Write the profit function for this sort of model as:  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) R NW V A N π =− +  (9) 
where V  are expected amortized vacancy costs.  One can write 









.  This model does not 
predict smaller establishments in cities but it does not predict larger ones. 
Now lets consider a model of agglomeration that does have the potential to explain the 
plant size-place effect.  Suppose that regions differ in the competitiveness of their product 
                                                 
11 One should note that if one has ‘constant returns to scale’ in the revenue function, profit maximization 
requires profits to be zero.  In this case the scale of individual employers is indeterminate in which case the 
model does not have any prediction at all about average plant sizes.  But, it then becomes hard to explain 
the strong pattern in two countries that can be seen in Figures 1 and 6.   17
markets with agglomerations being more competitive.  To keep things simple assume that 
output is given by N and that the price of output is given by  ( ) , PNA. 
To capture the idea that product markets are more competitive in bigger markets 
assume that the price elasticity of demand is smaller in agglomerations: 












In this case we have that the revenue function is given by  ( )( ) ,, R NA PNAN =  which, 












       ( 1 1 )  
In equilibrium it must be the case that  0 A P >  so that the implications of (11) for the 
average plant size depend on the sign of  NA P .  From (10), this can be positive.  Although, 
a model based on imperfect competition in product markets has the potential to explain 
the existence of the plant size-place effect, it has a problem to explain the existence of 
this phenomenon among tradeable sectors of the economy where we would expect 
product market competition not to be influenced by the size of the local market for the 
product. 
  It is for this reason that I turn to imperfect labour markets as a potential 
explanation for the plant size-place effect.  The models described above all assume the 
labour market is perfectly competitive and any employer in any region can hire any 
amount of labour at the going wage in that region.  The rest of the paper relaxes that 
assumption. 
  I am going to argue that a simple explanation of the empirical findings is that 
labour markets are not perfectly competitive, that they are monopsonistic.  In a very   18
general sense this can be thought of as a version of Marshall’s ‘labour pools’ story for 
agglomeration (Marshall, 1920).  But that story has always fitted uncomfortably with a 
view that labour markets are perfectly competitive (because the market wage is then a 
sufficient statistic for the labour supply curve to an individual employer).  The story I will 
tell has affinities with matching models of agglomeration (see Helsley and Strange, 1990, 
or Amiti and Pissarides, 2005) although they typically mix up monopsony effects with 
increased quality of matching – the latter effect has the problem discussed above.   
 
3.  Monopsony and the Plant Size-Place Effect 
This paper argues that the existence of monopsony in labour markets can help to explain 
the puzzle.  Why this might be the case can be explained very simply.  If labour markets 
are competitive then the labour supply curve facing an individual firm will be infinitely 
elastic at the market wage. Because wage costs are higher in cities, the labour supply 
curve to individual firms in cities and villages will look something like the curves drawn 
in Figure 7.  Suppose there are two firms who differ in their productivity of labour within 
them.  Both firms would choose to locate in the village unless the marginal product of 
labour curve itself varied with the location.  The search for such variation is at the heart 
of many theories of agglomeration discussed above. 
  But now suppose the labour market in both city and village is monopsonistic.  The 
defining feature of this is that the labour supply curve to the individual employer is 
upward-sloping.  One possibility (and a central claim of this paper is that there is 
evidence for this view) is that the firm level labour supply curves in city and village look 
like those drawn in Figure 8 with the labour market in the city being more competitive   19
than that in the village.  Now the low-productivity firm will still choose to locate in the 
village but the high-productivity firm will choose to locate in the city.  Wages will still be 
higher in the city than the village but there is no puzzle about why some firms prefer 
densely-populated areas – their labour costs are lower than if they recruited elsewhere.  
Of course this result depends on drawing the firm-level labour supply curve as more 
elastic in the city then village i.e. the labour market is more competitive in the city than 
village.  But the existence of agglomeration is now driven by differences in desired 
employer size.  Employers who want to be large either because their technology has a 
large minimum efficient size or because, for given technology, they are particularly 
productive will choose to locate in cities.  One way of summarizing this is that the quality 
of employers in cities will be higher. 
  There are a number of questions raised by this simple account that need to be 
answered.  Why should there be monopsony at all, in village or city?  Manning (2003a) 
has argued that employers do have pervasive monopsony power in modern labour 
markets but his arguments are not based on the classical notion of monopsony in which 
employers are large in relation to the size of their labour market for the simple reason that 
they are not (more evidence on this is presented below). Instead, he emphasizes how 
labour market frictions mean that workers do not instantaneously respond to changes in 
wages.  But, even if one believes in monopsony power in labour markets, one needs to 
provide a good explanation for why the labour supply curve is more elastic in cities so 
firms have more monopsony power in villages. 
 
   20
Why Should Larger Labour Markets Be More Competitive? 
Here, I present a simple model and some sufficient conditions for the elasticity of the 
labour supply curve to an individual employer to be higher in denser markets.  Assume 
that the utility  if u that worker i gets from firm f that pays log wages  f w  is: 
  if f if uw η = +  (12) 
where we assume that  if η  is distributed independently across workers and firms with 
density function  () f η  and distribution function  ( ) η F .  Denote by η the upper support 
of this distribution.  The unit coefficient on the log wage is simply a normalization.  We 
assume that each worker chooses the firm that offers the highest utility from among the D 
firms assumed to be in the market.  This model has close affinities to the circle model of 
Helsley and Strange (1990) though which firm is closest to which worker is stochastic 
here and deterministic in their model.  To keep the ideas simple let assume that all other 
firms pay w and this firm is considering paying wage  f w .  Then if a worker gets non-
monetary utility of η  from employment in this firm, the probability that they work for 
this firm is the probability that, in all the other (D-1) firms, the non-monetary utility is 
less than () f ww η −+ .  The probability of this happening is  ( )
1 D
f Fw w η
− − + .  Of 
course, η  is itself random so, to get total labour supply to the firm one has to integrate 
over all possible values of η . Hence, expected employment in the firm can be written as: 
  () ( ) ( )
1 ,
D
ff Nw w LF w w f d η ηε
− =− + ∫  (13)   21
To work out the elasticity of the labour supply curve facing the firm one simply 
differentiates (13) with respect to  f w .  The following Proposition says something about 
how this elasticity varies with D, the number of firms in the market. 
 
Proposition 2: If all firms pay the same wage then the elasticity of the labour supply 
curve facing an individual firm is: 
  () () ( ) () ( )
2
2
ln ln ln D ff N







∂∂ ∂ ∫  (14) 
Sufficient conditions for this to be increasing in the number of firms in the market are: 
 -  () 0 f η >  
and -  () f η  is log-concave 
Proof of Proposition 2: See Appendix. 
It should be emphasized that the conditions given are sufficient not necessary.  In 
particular, as D gets large, it is only the right-hand tail of the distribution that will get any 
weight in the final integral in (14) so that one only would need log-concavity in this tail 
to have the elasticity increasing in D.  The intuition for the result is that as the market size 
increases it becomes more likely that there is a firm in the market with a similar value of 
η making the choice of the worker a simple comparison of the wage. 
  Often theoretical papers make very particular assumptions about functional form 
so it is worthwhile briefly considering what some popular functional forms imply about 
the elasticity.  If η has a uniform distribution then only the first term in (14) is non-zero 
and the elasticity increases linearly with D.  On the other hand if η  has an extreme-value 
distribution (that would lead to a multinomial logit model for the choice of employer)   22
then one can show the elasticity is (D-1)/D, increasing in D but tending to an asymptote.  
Both of these two assumptions predict an elasticity increasing in D though they have 
different predictions about how the elasticity is likely to vary with D. 
    This section has shown that it is simple to construct models in which the intensity 
of labour market competition is greater in larger markets.  The next section shows how a 
model in which the elasticity of the labor supply curve increases with the number of firms 
can explain the existence of agglomeration and the plant size-place effect. 
 
4.  A Model of Agglomeration with Monopsonistic Markets 
In this section we present a simple model with 2 regions to show how monopsony can 
lead to an agglomeration equilibrium which would not occur if the labour market was 
perfectly competitive.  The model has some ‘reduced-form’ aspects to it but could be 
derived from a more fundamental model.  The different elements of the model are as 
follows. 
The Labour Supply Curve Within A Region 
Assume that the log-labour supply to a firm that pays log wage w in region R , denoted 
by  () w n
R  is given by the following ‘Dixt-Stiglitz’ form: 
  ()( ) ( )( )
RR R R R nw l d d ww ε =− + −  (15) 
where 
R l  is the log of the number of workers in the region, 
R d  is the log of the number 
of firms in the region, 
R w  is some wage index for the log average wages and ε  is the 
elasticity of labour supply with respect to the wage.  This labour supply curve says that 
firm that pays the average wage gets a labour supply equal to the average plant size in the 
region and this can be influenced by the wage it pays.  For this labour supply curve to   23
‘add up’ across firms it must be the case that the wage index is of a CES form and given 






ε ⎛⎞ = ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ∑  (16) 
In line with the arguments earlier in the paper we assume that the elasticity of the labour 
demand curve,  ()
R d ε  depends positively on the number of firms in the region. 
Firms 
Suppose that all firms have constant returns to scale but differ in the marginal product of 
labour.  A firm at position  f  in the productivity distribution is assumed to have marginal 
product of labour  () Pf.  All firms will choose the wage to maximize profits (P-W)N.  
The optimal log wage for a firm at position  f  in the productivity distribution in region 
R  is: 
  () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ln ln 1
RR R wf p f d d εε =+ − +  (17) 
which is the usual marginal product equals marginal cost of labour equation.  This then 
implies that log-profits for a firm at position  f  in the productivity distribution in region 
R  can be written as: 
  () () () () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1l n 1
RR R R R R R f dp f d ld d w πε ε ε =+ − + + − −  (18) 
Firms will choose their location to maximise this.  Note that we can write this as:  
  () ( ) ( ) () 1
RR R fd p f π εθ = +−  (19)   24
Note the important point that high-productivity firms are, other things equal, going to 
have a comparative advantage in locating in labour markets that are more competitive 
because a higher value of  ()
R d ε  enters multiplicatively with the productivity. 
 
The Allocation of Workers Across Regions 
Now consider the location of workers across markets.  We assume that workers base their 
decisions on the expected utility – as all workers are assumed identical this will mean that 
expected utility will be equalized across regions.  Expected utility might be influenced by 
the wage index and the number of firms as this affects the quality of the match (like in the 
model of the previous section).  Because we want to ‘turn off’ the match quality effect 
and focus purely on the monopsony effect, we will assume the number of firms has no 
effect on worker utility beyond any effect on the wage.   
Assume that the utility to a worker from locating in region r, is 
rr wh ξ −  where 
r h  is the log of housing costs.  Assuming that land in a region is not in completely 
inelastic supply, that housing is a normal good and that households (but not firms
12) 
demand land, assume that the log of housing costs in a region is given by: 
 
rr r hw l χζ =+  (20) 
Utility equalization across regions then implies that, in equilibrium:  
  () ( ) 11
AA BB wl wl ξχ ξζ ξχ ξζ −− = −−  (21) 
Which, on re-arrangement leads to:  
  ()







−=  (22) 
                                                 
12 This is a convenient assumption but nothing of importance depends on it.   25
So that if  1 ξχ <  (which is reasonable as otherwise an increase in earnings makes people 
worse off because the effect on house prices is so strong as to reduce utility), relative 
labour supply to the two regions is a positive function of relative wages in the two 
regions.  This also implies that the share of total labour supply in each region is only a 
function of relative wages  – denote it by: 
  ( ) ln
AA B ll ww λ ⎡ ⎤ =+ − ⎣ ⎦ (23) 
where l is the log of total population and we assume that  ( ) 00 . 5 λ =  so that identical 
regions each get half the available workers.   
Equilibrium 
An equilibrium will be an allocation of firms across regions such that no firm prefers to 
locate in any other region. 
 
There will always be a symmetric equilibrium in which half of workers and half of firms, 
chosen at random, locate in each of the two regions.  In this case the two regions are 
identical so there is no reason for any firm or worker to prefer one region over the other 
and this sustains the mixed strategy equilibrium.  
But, we are interested in the possibility of an agglomeration equilibrium in which 
the number of firms in the two regions is unequal.  First, we will derive some necessary 
properties that must be satisfied in any agglomeration equilibrium and then we will 
provide a sufficient equilibrium for an agglomeration equilibrium to exist.  Without loss 
of generality let us assume that in an agglomeration equilibrium it is region A that has the 
largest number of firms. 
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Proposition 3:  Any agglomeration equilibrium must have all the highest productivity 
firms in region A. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The reason for this is the comparative advantage point made earlier.  An important 
consequence of this is that firms in the agglomeration will have higher productivity than 
those outside it but there is nothing causal about this – it is simply a result of employer 
sorting.  The empirical literature on the relationship between market size and productivity 
does not really establish anything more than a correlation for the simple reason that it is 
hard to randomly alter plant location
13. 
  One can also prove the following result about the constellation of correlations we 
would observe in the data. 
 
Proposition 4:  The agglomeration has: 
a.  more firms 
b.  higher average productivity 
c.  higher average wages 
d.  more workers 
e.  higher average firm size. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
The intuition for all these results is straightforward except perhaps the last.  The intuition 
for this is that firms that pay the ‘average’ wage (or lower wages) in the high-wage region 
                                                 
13 One notable exception to this is Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2007) who compare areas which saw 
the influx of a large plant with those that just missed out – they find evidence of sizeable productivity 
effects.   27
do not gain from the fact that the labour market is more competitive there (see (15)), so 
can only be induced to locate there because of a larger labour pool per firm which 
translates into a larger average firm size. 
  Nothing proven so far has established the existence of an agglomeration 
equilibrium – the following Proposition provides some sufficient conditions. 
  
Proposition 5:  A sufficient condition for the existence of an agglomeration equilibrium 
is: 
() () () () () ( ) () () () ln 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
AB AB AB ww ww ww λλ ε ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ −− − −> − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
where  () 0.5
A w  is the average wage in region A if the most productive 50% of firms 
locate there and   () 0.5
B w  is the average wage in region B if the least productive 50% of 
firms locate there. 
Proof: See Appendix 
The intuition for this condition can most easily be understood in the following way.  For 
an agglomeration equilibrium to exist it must be the case that if the best 50% of firms are 
in region A and the worst 50% in region B, the median firm can make more profits by 
locating in A.  The median firm will locate in region A if, for a given wage, labour supply 
is higher there – this follows from (15) as the elasticity will be the same in the two 
regions if the number of firms is the same. There are two conflicting factors that affect 
labour supply for a given wage - both come from the fact that wages will be higher in 
region A as average employer quality is higher there.  First, the higher wages in region A 
will attract more workers and this increases the supply of labour to all firms located in 
that region.  But the higher wages also tend to reduce labour supply to an individual firm   28
for a given wage.  It is the relative size of these two effects that is important. is that the 
regional labour supply effect must dominate the wage competition effect to make it more 
profitable for the median firm to locate in the high-wage region in this scenario.  This is a 
reasonable condition as wage differentials of the order of 20% seem to be able to support 
differences in labour market size of several hundred percent and the micro evidence does 
not suggest a particularly large wage elasticity in labour supply to the individual firm.    
  So far we have shown that a model of a monopsonistic labor market in which 
larger markets are more competitive can explain the plant size-place effect and why 
wages and productivity are higher in agglomerations.  But there remains work to be done 
in arguing that this is a plausible prediction and testing further predictions of the model.  
This work takes up the rest of the paper. 
 
5.  How Much Monopsony Power? 
Bunting (1962) studied employer concentration in US labour markets and showed that 
there were very few markets in which employer concentration was sizeable.  He 
concluded that very few employers were likely to have any monopsony power, a 
conclusion that, if correct, would mean the failure of the basic hypothesis of this paper.  
His conclusion about the low levels of employer concentration remains true today but 
modern theories of monopsony (see Manning, 2003a,b) emphasize that employers do not 
have to be large in relation to their labour market to have some market power.  However, 
this leaves open the question of how much market power they possess, and whether the 
the elasticity of the labour supply curve needed to explain agglomeration lies in a 
‘plausible’ range.   29
  This section shows how data on labour markets of different sizes can be used to 
obtain an estimate of the elasticity of the labour supply curve facing an individual 
employer.  It is helpful to think of there being a continuum of labor markets indexed by 
the average log wage index, w – the high wage regions will be the agglomerations.  In 
each region there will be an average log employer size, denoted by n(w) and an elasticity 
of the labour supply curve facing the firm,  ( ) w ε .  Both n(w) and  ( ) w ε  will be 
increasing in their arguments.  An individual firm f can think that if it locates in labour 
market with average wage w and pays wage  f w  then its labor supply will be given, from 
a modification of (15), as:  
  () ( ) ( )( ) , ff nw w nw w w w ε = +−  (24) 
When thinking about location, a necessary condition for profit maximization is that, 
given the wage the firm pays, it chooses the labour market where that wage brings forth 
the greatest labour supply.  So, a necessary condition for profit maximization is:  
  ()










=+ − − =
∂
 (25) 
Evaluating this at the average wage for each region i.e.  f ww =  leads to the equation: 
  ( ) ( ) ' wn w ε =  (26) 
i.e. one can estimate the elasticity of the labour supply curve facing the average firm 
within its region using the elasticity of plant size with respect to wages across regions.  
The latter is observable so one can then ask whether this elasticity matches up with other 
evidence on the elasticity of the labour supply curve facing individual firms.  Of course, 
this result is derived under the assumption that all of agglomeration can be explained by 
the monopsony effect which is a claim far stronger than this paper would wish to make.    30
But the plausibility of the estimate can be used to address its potential importance and to 
think about what it cannot explain. 
  Figure 9 plots of log of average wages against the log of average plant size for US 
counties, together with the regression line.  There is a clear positive relationship.  Figure 
10 does the same for UK TTWAs.  Some regressions to summarize the results are shown 
in Table 8 where a measure of log average wages is regressed against the log of average 
plant size.  For the UK we report estimates using the unadjusted average wage and the 
average wage after controlling for age, occupation and industry.  As the theory predicts 
there is a positive relationship in both the UK and the US.  These estimates suggest the 
existence of considerable monopsony power – from (26) the coefficients can be 
interpreted as one over the elasticity of the labour supply curve facing an individual firm. 
     
 
6.  The Elasticity of the Labour Supply Curve Facing Individual Employers 
An important component of the idea put forward here is that the elasticity of the labour 
supply curve facing employers is higher in agglomerations: a direct test of the hypothesis 
would be to provide evidence of this.  Unfortunately it is not clear that we have good 
evidence on this elasticity for any employers – Manning (2003a, ch.4) reviews the 
arguments.  But a simple-minded approach is to use as a estimate of the inverse of the 
labour supply elasticity, the employer size wage effect (ESWE), as this measures how 
much higher are the wages paid by large employers.  Manning (2003a, ch4) gives reasons 
why this is likely to be a downward-biased estimate of the true labour supply elasticity 
but if this bias is the same in city and village it is perhaps meaningful to compare the 
employer size wage effect in and out of agglomerations.   31
  Table 9 presents some US evidence on this.  The data are taken from the April 
1993 Contingent Worker Survey Supplement to the Current Population Survey, the latest 
main US data source that contains employer size.  Also, the CPS contains limited 
information on the location of workers – here we simply compare workers in and out of 
MSAs as this seems the most telling comparison given the earlier evidence.  The columns 
headed 1a and 1b simply report the coefficient on log employer size where no other 
covariates are included – the coefficient is, as the theory would predict, lower in MSAs.  
The next two columns then include personal characteristics (age, race, gender, education) 
– the inclusion of these variables reduces the employer-size wage effect (this is well-
known) but the ESWE is lower in MSAs.  The columns 3a-3c then also include controls 
for industry and occupation and also includes an equation for large MSAs.  Again we see 
the same pattern – a decline in the ESWE as the size of the labour market increases.   
  Table 10 then does a similar exercise for British data.  The data used here comes 
from the New Earnings Survey for 1997-2001.  It has one advantage over the US CPS 
data used in the previous data – namely it does contain information on the TTWA the 
worker is in.  However, it also has one disadvantage – it contains information only on 
firm size and not plant size.  This is likely to make it harder to find the effect we want as, 
for example, small rural bank branches will describe themselves as being part of a very 
large firm. 
  The first column reports the result of a regression of log wages on a quadratic in 
log labour market size, the log of firm size and the log of firm size interacted with the log 
of labour market size.  The coefficient on this interaction term is, as the theory predicts, 
negative and significantly different from zero.  The second column shows that this is   32
robust to including a full set of dummies for age, occupation and 4-digit industry.  The 
third and fourth columns then repeat the exercize but also including the log of firm size 
interacted with a quadratic in labour market size – the quadratic term is not significantly 
different from zero.  The final two columns exploit the fact that the NES is a panel which 
follows the same individuals over time.  This means that we can include individual fixed 
effects and still identify the coefficients of interest off those who change the firm for 
which they work and change the area in which they work.  The last two columns show 




This paper has proposed a stylized fact – that, on average, plants are larger in 
agglomerations.  This is the plant size-place effect.  This effect is more marked when 
comparing villages and towns with cities than when comparing small and large cities.  It 
is argued that this stylized fact is something of a problem for many existing theories of 
agglomeration as many of them actually predict that plant sizes should be smaller in large 
markets.  Hence, there is a need for a theory to explain why large plants have a 
comparative advantage in locating in large markets.  
  This paper proposes one explanation for this – that labour markets are 
monopsonsitic but that they are more competitive in large markets where the supply 
curve is also moved further out. This can be thought of as one form of Marshall’s ‘labour 
pools’ argument.  The wage premium that needs to be paid when locating in city and 
village is then lower for large plants and this is the source of the comparative advantage   33
necessary to explain the plant size-place effect.  Some evidence was presented to suggest 
that the labour supply curve facing individual employers is more elastic in large markets. 
  It should be emphasized that this paper is not claiming that monopsony can 
explain all of agglomeration – I strongly suspect that the other factors discussed in the 
literature are also relevant.  But, perhaps more attention should be paid to the labour 
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Technical Appendix 
   
Proof of Proposition 2:  
Take the log of (13) so that we have: 
  () ( ) ( )
1 log , log log
D
ff Nw w L F w w f d ε εε
− =+ − + ∫  (27) 
The elasticity is then the derivative of this with respect to  f w  (remember, the wage is 
already in logs).  This yields: 
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Now let us evaluate this at a symmetric equilibrium in which all firms pay w in which 
case (28) becomes:  
 


















The denominator in this case can just be written as (1/D) which is just the share of 
employment if all firms pay the same wage.  Integrating the numerator by parts, we have 
that:  
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Integrating the final term in (30) by parts we have that:  
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∫  (31)   35
which is (14).  Differentiating this with respect to D leads to:  













∂∂ ∫  (32) 
The sufficient conditions given will ensure this is positive. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
Suppose that a firm at position  f  in the productivity distribution chooses to locate in 
region A.  Using (18) this implies that: 
 
() () ( ) () () ( ) ( ) ()
() () () ()()
11
0
A B AA BB
AB A B
ff d p f d p f
dd p f
π πε θ ε θ
εε θ θ
−= + − − + −
=− − − ≥
 (33) 
Now consider a firm with productivity  ' f  where  ' f f > .  We have that:  
 
() () ( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
() () () () ()
() () () () ( ) () () () ()
' ' 1' 1'
'
'0
AB A A B B
AB A B
AB A B
ff d p f d p f
dd p f
d d pf pf f f
π πε θ ε θ
εε θ θ
εε ππ
−= + − − + −
=− − −
=− − +− >
 (34) 
where the last line follows from (33) and the fact that the elasticity of labour supply is 
higher in region A. 
This ‘single-crossing’ property implies that any agglomeration equilibrium must 
be of the form of a cut-off  * f  such that all firms with  * f f >  locate in region A and all 
firms with  * f f <  locate in region B.  For there to be more firms in region A it 
obviously must be the case that * 0.5 f < . 
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Proof of Proposition 4: 
Part a is the definition of the agglomeration. 
Part b follows directly from Proposition 2. 
Part c. then follows from (17) as the agglomeration both has more productive firms and is 
more competitive as it has more firms. 
Part d. follows from parts b. and c. and (23). 
Part e. Consider a firm that pays a wage 
A ww =  - in an agglomeration equilibrium this 
firm must be in region A.  This means that a shift to region B while paying the same 
wage must result in lower employment or else profits would be higher in region B.   wage 
such that 
AB ww w ≥> .  From (15) this implies that: 
  () () ( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0
A A B A AA BB BAB nw nw l d l d d w w ε − = −− −− −≥  (35) 
As 
AB ww >  this implies that: 
  ( ) ( )
AA BB ld ld −> − (36) 
and part e. follows from the observation that log average firm size is given by () ld − .   
Proof of Proposition 5 
I will show this using a fixed-point argument.  Suppose that the cut-off for the firm 
location decisions is  * f  as Proposition 2 shows must be the case in any agglomeration 
equilibrium.  Using (16), (17) and (23) one can then derive the number of workers and 
average wages in the two regions as a function of  * f .  
Given that this is the case let us consider the optimal location decisions of firms.  
Given the single-crossing property of the profit functions, this must also be a cut-off,  ˆ f , 
such that all firms further up the productivity distribution than this locate in region A and   37
the others in region B.  Obviously an interior solution for  ˆ f  must have profits for a firm 
at that position being equal in the two regions so one has that  ˆ f  must satisfy: 
 
() () () () () () ( ) ( ) () ( )
() () () () () () () () ()()
ˆ 11* l n 11* * l n 1* 1* *
ˆ 1* l n 1* * l n * * *
AA
BB
f pf f l f f f w f
fp f f l f f f w f
εε ε
εε ε
+ − −+ − + −− − −
=+ − + + − −
(37) 
 If there is no value such that this is satisfied then we must have a corner solution in 
which all firms would choose to locate in one region or another.  One can think of the 
(37) as giving a solution  () ˆ * f f .  An equilibrium must be a fixed point of this mapping. 
  A sufficient condition for an agglomeration equilibrium is that if the firms split 
equally between the two regions with the most productive locating in region A then the 
median firm will also locate in region A.  Using (37) this leads to the condition in 
Proposition 4.  38
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics: US Counties 
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Number of Counties  3102  3102 
 
Table 2 
The Relationship Between Log Average Establishment Size  
and Log Total Employment:US Counties 
Dependent Variable: Log Average Establishment Size 
 











Total Employment  0.171 
[0.003] 
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 3102  0.27 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.   39
Table 3 
The Relationship Between Log Average Establishment Size  




2-digt 2-digt 3-digt 3-digt 4-digt 4-digt 5-digt 5-digt 6-digt 6-digt 
Dependent Variable: Log Average Establishment Size 
0.344 0.339 0.578 0.474 0.199 0.415 0.042 0.374 -0.066 0.359  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size  [0.022] [0.018] [0.024] [0.019] [0.033] [0.023] [0.032] [0.027] [0.029] [0.028] 
-0.006 -0.007 -0.015 -0.014 0.002  -0.01  0.007 -0.008 0.011 -0.008  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size 
Squared 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] 
Observations  44093  44093  92107  92107  161621 161621 208548 208548 213392 213392 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Establishments with 1-4 Employees 
-10.903 -10.234 -13.357 -11.407 -11.476  -12.929 -9.528 -13.407 -8.031 -13.774  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size  [0.515] [0.508] [0.475] [0.451] [0.468] [0.442] [0.496] [0.456] [0.539] [0.476] 
0.429 0.412 0.543 0.459 0.416 0.517 0.327 0.517  0.24  0.536  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size 
Squared 
[0.026] [0.026] [0.025] [0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.026] [0.024] [0.028] [0.025] 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Establishments with 5-9 Employees 
2.479 2.887 1.725 2.515 2.137 2.935 2.443  3.15  2.524 3.005  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size  [0.417] [0.414] [0.322] [0.317] [0.254] [0.243] [0.235] [0.221] [0.228] [0.212] 
-0.133 -0.152 -0.102 -0.124 -0.121 -0.135  -0.131 -0.14 -0.136 -0.13  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size 
Squared 
[0.021] [0.021] [0.016] [0.016] [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Establishments with 10-19 Employees 
4.121 4.005 3.346 3.442 3.077 3.776 2.793 3.964 2.541 3.932  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size  [0.257] [0.256] [0.219] [0.218] [0.182] [0.180] [0.176] [0.172] [0.168] [0.164] 
-0.182 -0.181  -0.14  -0.14  -0.121  -0.15 -0.104  -0.149 -0.09 -0.147  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size 
Squared 
[0.013] [0.013] [0.011] [0.011] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] 
Dependent Variable: Fraction of Establishments with 20+ Employees 
4.304 3.342 8.287  5.45  6.263 6.218 4.292 6.293 2.966 6.836  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size  [0.290] [0.283] [0.310] [0.283] [0.337] [0.297] [0.350] [0.302] [0.417] [0.342] 
-0.114 -0.079 -0.301 -0.195 -0.175 -0.232 -0.091 -0.228 -0.014 -0.259  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size 
Squared 
[0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.018] [0.016] [0.018] [0.016] [0.022] [0.018] 
Observations  59846  59846  178177 178177 429716 429716 686116 686116 792896 792896 
Industry 
Controls 
no Yes no Yes no yes no yes no yes 
 
Notes. 
1.  standard errors reported in parentheses and computed clustering on the county.   40
 
Table 4 
The Relationship Between Log Average Establishment Size  


























0.028 0.491 1.839  0.517  0.781 0.217  0.894 0.372  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size  [0.124] [0.046] [0.087]  [0.020]  [0.040] [0.041]  [0.035] [0.025] 
-0.001 -0.015 -0.087  -0.018  -0.024 -0.007  -0.035 -0.009  Coefficient on 
Log Market Size 
Squared 
[0.006] [0.002] [0.004]  [0.001]  [0.002] [0.002]  [0.002] [0.001] 
Constant 1.31  -1.484 -5.646  -0.977 -3.319 1.532  -2.709  -1.141 
 [0.596]  [0.214]  [0.415]  [0.093]  [0.184] [0.190]  [0.163] [0.113] 
Observations 1200  2930  2693  3066  2988  2933  2955  2992 




Descriptive Statistics: UK Travel-to-Work Areas 
 





























Number of TTWAs  297  297 




The Relationship Between Log Average Establishment Size  
and Log Total Employment:UK Travel-to-Work Areas 
Dependent Variable: Log Average Establishment Size 
 

















Total Employment  0.147 
[0.009] 
     297 0.56 
Total Employment  0.153 
[0.008] 
    -0.681 
[0.039] 
297 0.58 




   297  0.62 




  -0.119 
[0.093] 
297  0.62 













   297  0.54 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets.   42
Table 7 
The Relationship Between Log Establishment Size and Labour Pools: 
UK Ward Data 
Measure of Labour 




Coefficient on Log 
Labour Pool 
[standard error] 







Own  Ward  50  0.335 [0.019] -0.014 [0.001]  9524  0.2 
Own  Ward  75  0.268 [0.021] -0.009 [0.001]  9524  0.13 
Own Ward  90  0.29  [0.022]  -0.01  [0.001]  9524  0.1 
Own Ward  95  0.281  [0.022]  -0.01  [0.001]  9524  0.1 
Wards within 5km 
(including own 
ward) 
50  0.351 [0.019] -0.017 [0.001]  9524  0.13 
Wards within 5km 
(including own 
ward) 
75  0.337 [0.024] -0.015 [0.001]  9524  0.07 
Wards within 5km 
(including own 
ward) 
90  0.382 [0.027] -0.016 [0.001]  9525  0.05 
Wards within 5km 
(including own 
ward) 
95  0.418 [0.028] -0.018 [0.001]  9525  0.05 
Wards within 5km 
(excluding own 
ward) 
50  0.338 [0.023] -0.016 [0.002]  8869  0.08 
Wards within 5km 
(excluding own 
ward) 
75  0.345 [0.030] -0.016 [0.002]  8869  0.04 
Wards within 5km 
(excluding own 
ward) 
90  0.424 [0.034] -0.019 [0.002]  8870  0.03 
Wards within 5km 
(excluding own 
ward) 
95  0.462 [0.035] -0.021 [0.002]  8870  0.03 
Wards within 10km 
(including own 
ward) 
50  0.344 [0.025] -0.016 [0.002]  9524  0.07 
Wards within 10km 
(including own 
ward) 
75  0.39  [0.030] -0.018 [0.002]  9525  0.05 
Wards within 10km 
(including own 
ward) 
90 0.445  [0.037]  -0.02  [0.002] 9525  0.03 
Wards within 10km 
(including own 
ward) 
95  0.563 [0.044] -0.025 [0.002]  9525  0.03 
Wards within 10km 
(excluding own 
ward) 
50  0.367 [0.026] -0.017 [0.002]  9513  0.07 
Wards within 10km 
(excluding own 
ward) 
75  0.4  [0.031] -0.018 [0.002]  9514  0.05 
Wards within 10km 
(excluding own 
ward) 
90  0.47  [0.038] -0.021 [0.002]  9514  0.03 
Wards within 10km 
(excluding own 
ward) 
95  0.538 [0.043] -0.024 [0.002]  9514  0.03 
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Table 8 
The Plant-Size Wage Effect Across Markets 
 
 US  UK  UK 












log average plant size  0.385  0.113  0.045 
 [0.012]  [0.018]  [0.008] 
Constant 0.709  1.702  -0.147 
 [0.028]  [0.042]  [0.019] 
Observations 3102  297  297 
R-squared 0.4  0.11  0.09 
Notes. 
1.  The US estimates are for counties, the UK estimates are for TTWAs 
2.  US data on average establishment size and average earnings are from County Business Patterns 
3.  UK data on average establishment size from ABI and on average earnings from NES.  Adjusted wages 
are residuals are from earnings function controlling for a full set of age, industry and occupation 
dummies.  
4.  Robust standard errors in parentheses  44
Table 9 
The Employer Size-Wage Effect In and Out of Cities: US Evidence 
 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 3c 
MSA  Status  Non-MSA MSA Non-MSA MSA Non-MSA MSA  Large 
MSA 
Log  Employer  0.1201 0.1071 0.0759 0.0598 0.0671 0.0567 0.0495 








No No No No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other Sample 
Restrictions 
No No No No No No No 
Observations  1708 5003 1684 4939 1684 4939 3978 
R-squared  0.12 0.1 0.39  0.36  0.48  0.43  0.42 
Notes: Data come from April 1993 Contingent Worker 
Dependent variables is log hourly wage 
Sample is restricted to non-union. 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
Log employer size is computed using mid-points of size class with... 
 
Table 10 
The Variation in the Employer Size-Wage Effect With Labour Market Size: UK Evidence 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
-0.273 -0.592 -0.771 -0.303 0.151  0.152  Log labour 
market size  [0.197] [0.094] [0.387] [0.208] [0.055] [0.055] 
0.879 0.731 1.209 0.539 0.025 0.025  Log labour 
market size 
Squared 
[0.127] [0.057] [0.287] [0.151] [0.034] [0.034] 
0.46  0.528 0.137 0.716 0.217 0.217  Log firm 
Size  [0.080] [0.042] [0.200] [0.105] [0.022] [0.022] 
-0.545 -0.211 0.348  -0.73  -0.086 -0.086  Log firm 
Size * Log labour 
market size 
[0.121] [0.060] [0.621] [0.323] [0.028] [0.028] 
   -0.591  0.344     Log firm Size * Log labour 
market size squared     [0.470]  [0.240]    
Other  Controls  No Yes No Yes No yes 
Fixed  Effects  No No No No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  422440 422283 422440 422283 422440 380594 
R-squared  0.05 0.65 0.05 0.65 0.18 0.18 
Notes: Data come from New Earnings Survet for 1997-2001 
Dependent variables is log hourly wage excluding overtime 
Sample is restricted to private sector 
standard errors clustered on TTWA in brackets 
Log firm size is computed using mid-points of size class with...   45
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Figure 3 
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Graphs by Type of Data
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Figure 5 
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The Relationship Between Average Establishment Size and Log Total Employment: UK Travel-to-Work 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 9 
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